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Abstract 
We examine the role of the news media during the British Railway Mania, arguably one of 
the largest financial bubbles in history.  Our analysis suggests that the press responded to 
changes in the stock market, and its reporting of recent events may have influenced asset 
prices. However, we find no evidence that the sentiment of the media, or the attention which 
it gave to particular stocks, had any influence on exacerbating or ending the Mania. The main 
contribution of the media was to provide factual information which investors could use to 
inform their decisions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we analyse the role of the news media during the Railway Mania which 
occurred in Britain in the mid-1840s.  During this episode, hundreds of new railways were 
promoted and railway stocks experienced a substantial asset price reversal.  Contemporaries 
and modern commentators have both suggested that this period was one of the greatest 
bubbles in economic history (Mackay, 1856; Economist, 2008).   
The scale and consequences of the asset price reversals which occurred in technology 
stocks during the Dot-Com Bubble and in property during the Housing Bubble makes an 
understanding of such episodes particularly important.  The role of the news media is of 
special concern as it may play a crucial feedback role in exacerbating price movements by 
publicising recent changes which draw new investors into the market, and by shaping public 
opinion through their coverage of new-era stories which justify high asset prices (Akerlof and 
Shiller, 2009, p.55).  Shiller (2005, p.105) has gone so far as to suggest that the news media 
are ‘fundamental propagators of speculative price movements through their efforts to make 
news interesting to their audience’.  The only paper to test directly Shiller’s hypothesis is 
Bhattacharya et al. (2009), who find that media hype does not explain the Dot-Com Bubble.  
However, recent studies, which do not focus on bubble episodes per se, have suggested that 
the media can affect investor sentiment (Tetlock, 2007; Engelberg and Parsons, 2011; Dougal 
et al., 2012).  By examining the relationship between the media and the market in an 
historical and non-US context, we can determine whether these recent findings regarding the 
role of the media are robust across time and space. Our main finding is that although media 
coverage responded to events, and played a role in disseminating information, it did not 
amplify the extent of the asset price reversal during the Mania or contribute to its bursting.  
An analysis of the effect of the news media during the Railway Mania is particularly 
pertinent for at least four reasons.  First, newspapers and periodicals were the only source of 
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information for most investors during the 1840s as there was no analyst or institutional 
coverage of stocks and companies were not typically required to distribute financial accounts 
to stockholders (Baskin and Miranti, 1997; Cheffins, 2008).  Consequently, one would expect 
news media coverage to be a potentially influential source of information, which could easily 
be hyped. Second, the 1840s marked the beginning of extensive press coverage of financial 
markets by the British news media (Preda, 2001; Taylor, 2012), which means we are 
examining the influence of media on financial markets at the origin.  Third, the railway 
periodicals of the time had a large incentive to hype the Mania and keep it going as they 
received substantial amounts of revenue from advertising the prospectuses of new railways.  
Fourth, The Times, the leading daily newspaper at the time, along with the Economist, was 
accused of causing the market collapse through a series of critical editorials.  Hence, we have 
a ready-made hypothesis regarding the media.   
To determine the nature of coverage during the Mania, we use two approaches to 
quantifying the sentiment of media articles at this time.  Firstly, we collected every editorial 
article in the Railway Times, as well as the front page of the Economist and its weekly 
railway supplement, and converted them to text files.  We then apply Linguistic Inquiry and 
Word Count (LIWC) content analysis software to this database of media articles in order to 
evaluate the scale (word count) and positivity of media coverage.  Secondly, we manually 
evaluated articles in a two-year window either side of the Mania peak, and give a subjective 
assessment of how positive each article was in its tone.  This allows us to ensure that the 
content was relevant to shareholders, and makes it possible to distinguish between the 
reporting of past events and the forecasting of future developments.  
To evaluate the impact of the media on asset prices, we collected weekly stock prices 
for the 591 railway stocks (representing 332 railway companies) and a sample of 22 of the 
largest non-railway companies which were traded on the London Stock Exchange.  Then, 
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using this data to form indices of railway and non-railway stocks, we estimate Newey-West 
regressions to see how stock returns were related to the scale and positivity of news media 
coverage in the railway press.   
As The Times and Economist were accused of bursting the bubble through a series of 
highly critical editorials, we also use an event study methodology to see if the market for 
railway stocks reacted negatively to these editorials.   
Although the tone of coverage is the most direct way by which the media could affect 
investor sentiment, it is also possible that the extent of coverage could exacerbate price 
movements as investors may be more likely to purchase a stock which receives more 
attention.  To address this issue, we also test whether the amount of coverage received by 
individual stocks resulted in them having higher returns.  Each text file from the Railway 
Times and the Economist’s railway supplement was searched, and the number of times that 
each railway company was mentioned was recorded.  Portfolios of stocks were then formed 
according to whether stocks received extensive, low or no media coverage, and the returns on 
these portfolios were analysed, controlling for standard risk factors. 
We find evidence that the media responded to stock returns, for example by 
commenting on a stock market crash, and there is a suggestion that stock returns responded to 
the reporting of events which had already occurred.  However, we find no evidence that the 
forecasts made by the media had any impact on stock prices, and consequently, contrary to 
Shiller’s (2005) claim, the media cannot be said to have played an important role in 
exacerbating the Mania for investing.  In addition, our findings from the event studies imply 
that The Times and Economist were not responsible for bringing the asset price reversal to an 
end, contrary to the claims of contemporaries.  We also find that the coverage of individual 
stocks did not affect their returns, once other factors are controlled for. Consequently, 
although we find that media coverage varied over the course of the Mania, this was in 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
5 
 
response to events, and the media cannot be regarded as necessarily contributing to the 
changes.  The main role of the media was to report factual information. 
Our paper is closely related to a broader literature which examines the role of the 
media in financial markets.  At the microscopic level, there is some evidence that news media 
coverage can affect the prices of individual stocks even though no new information is 
released (Huberman and Regev, 2001; Fang and Peress, 2009).  At the aggregate level, Cutler 
et al. (1989) suggests that large stock-market movements are not necessarily explained by 
media coverage of important events.  More recently, however, Tetlock (2007, 2010) finds 
evidence that news media coverage is connected to subsequent stock market movements, 
suggesting that the media affects investor sentiment.  Engelberg and Parsons (2011) 
disentangle the causal impact of news media, finding that media coverage alters investment 
behaviour, whilst Dougal et al. (2012) find that the news media affects the stock market by 
amplifying or attenuating current investor sentiment. 
Given the potential conflicts of interest and bias of the railway press, this paper also 
contributes to the literature on biases within financial news media.  For example, Dyck and 
Zingales (2003a,b) argue that financial reporters have incentives to enter into quid pro quo 
relationships with their sources so as to obtain private information, but in return they provide 
a positive spin on companies’ news.  During booms, the value of this relationship is higher, 
implying that the pro-company bias in the press will be greater, thus fuelling asset price 
bubbles. Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) find that the personal finance publications, but not the 
national press, exhibit a bias towards mutual funds which advertise in previous issues. 
Bignon and Miscio (2010) find existence of a media bias in early twentieth-century France, 
where companies had to make payments for coverage in newspapers’ editorial sections.  The 
theoretical literature on media bias argues that it can be reduced by competition in the media 
market and independent sources of ex post news verification (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006) 
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as well as reader heterogeneity (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005).  Notably, in the case of the 
Railway Mania, there was intense competition between multiple railway periodicals and 
reader heterogeneity in terms of class, wealth and socio-occupational status (Parliamentary 
Papers, 1845, 1846).     
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section two reviews the background to 
the Railway Mania and the concomitant rise of the financial press.  Section three outlines our 
empirical strategy and data.  Section four reports the findings on the scale and positivity of 
the media during the Mania.  Section five examines the relationship between news media 
coverage and market returns.  Section six examines whether the critical editorials in The 
Times and Economist played a role in ending the Mania.  Section seven examines the media 
coverage of individual companies to ascertain whether the scale of media coverage affected 
individual stock returns. Section eight discusses the role of the media in providing 
information during the Mania.  The final section is a brief discussion and overview of our 
findings. 
 
2. The Railway Mania and the financial press 
The Railway Mania is viewed as one of the greatest bubbles in history because over 1,000 
railway companies were promoted during 1844-45 and, contemporaneously, a comprehensive 
index of railway stocks doubled between mid-1843 and the summer of 1845, as shown in 
Figure 1.  However, the market for railway stocks declined precipitously in the fall of 1845, 
and ended the decade well below the level of 1843.  In the process, many newly-promoted 
railway schemes were aborted or merged with other companies.  Nevertheless, the railway 
system expanded rapidly as a result of the Mania, with the network which endured into the 
twentieth century being largely in place by 1852 (Mitchell, 1964, pp.315-6).  
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Although this episode has sometimes been explained as mania, delusion and irrational 
behaviour on the part of investors (Francis, 1851; Hyndman, 1892, p.55; Lewin, 1936; Gayer 
et al., 1953, p.380; Simmons, 1978; Kindleberger, 1984, p.201), there were considerable 
changes in fundamental factors, such as dividends, at this time (Campbell, 2012).  However, 
as we shall see below, there were also important changes in the scale and content of media 
coverage of the railways throughout this period. 
There were several newspapers dedicated to commenting on the railway industry. 
This railway press arose largely to meet the information needs of the popular investor who 
had become increasingly important in the years preceding the Mania (Preda, 2001).  These 
periodicals carried share price tables, editorial commentary on the railway sector and railway 
stocks, letters from readers, company financial reports, reports of company AGMs, and 
advertisements from railway promoters seeking investors.  Of the three largest railway 
periodicals, the Railway Times had by far the widest circulation, as shown in Table 1, and the 
median circulation in 1845 of the other 16 periodicals was only 10,750 (Parliamentary 
Papers, 1852). 
<<INSERT TABLE 1>> 
 Unsurprisingly, for a periodical which was read by railway investors and which 
received an estimated £14,000 (£1.12m in today’s money) a week from advertisements paid 
for by railway companies (Kostal, 1994, p.37), the Railway Times was sympathetic to the 
railway industry. During the boom, they agreed that many of the companies would be good 
investments, and in the midst of the market crash in October 1845 they argued that it was the 
work of brokers and jobbers ‘to get possession of valuable stock at reduced prices.’1  
There was also considerable commentary on the railways from the mainstream press. 
                                                     
1
 Railway Times, October 18, 1845, p.1961 
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 The Times, which, as can be seen from Table 1, was by some distance the leading daily 
newspaper in 1845 in terms of circulation and influence (Simmons, 1991, p.240)
 2
, discussed 
the railways extensively in a series of editorials.
3
 These articles were extremely critical of 
what The Times believed to be excessive speculation in railway shares.  For example, on the 
weekend prior to the beginning of the market crash, October 18 1845, they said that ‘the 
mania for railway speculation has reached that height at which all follies, however absurd in 
themselves, cease to be ludicrous, and become, by reason of their universality, fit subjects for 
the politician to consider as well as the moralist.’4  Several weeks later they published what 
has been termed an exposé of the madness of railway speculation (Simmons, 1978, p.40).  
Contemporaries accused The Times of bearing the market for gain and ultimately causing the 
market for railway stocks to collapse (Tuck, 1846).  The leading article in the Railway Times 
each week between October 18 and December 13, 1845 focused on the role of The Times in 
causing the collapse of the market for railway stocks.   
The Economist, which had begun publication in 1843, also criticised the speculation 
in railway shares.  It had quickly become known as an influential commentator on political 
economy and provided detailed analysis of the potential consequences of the Mania.  They 
published a particularly strongly worded article opposing railway speculation on April 5 
1845, five months prior to the market crash.  They argued that new railway construction 
would ‘form a severe drain on the available capital of the country,’ and that it would be 
‘discovered that a large portion who hold shares have done so only on speculation; that they 
are unable to pay their calls; and all the weaker undertakings will be suspended for want of 
                                                     
2
 These figures do not capture the full readership of The Times as it was commonly passed on to others and read 
aloud in public houses (Brown, 1985, pp.27-9, 50). 
3
 By the 1840s, The Times was printing lists of stock prices (including railways) and giving a brief comment on 
activity in the money and government debt markets.  It was only at the beginning of 1846 that there was a 
section of the paper devoted solely to the market for railway stocks.  This section usually contained a very brief 
(one or two sentences) factual report on the level of activity in the market for railway stocks. 
4
 The Times, October 18, 1845, p.5 
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capital’.5  In addition to editorials in the main paper, the Economist also included a separate 
section dedicated to the railways from January 1845, which was then expanded to become the 
Railway Monitor supplement in October 1845, just a few weeks prior to the market crash.  
This supplement in its first issue contained an extensive discussion of why the extent of new 
railway promotion was unsustainable, and would result in much ‘temporary mischief.’6 
In addition to newspapers, there were several other sources which investors may have 
used. There were a number of pamphlets which offered general investment advice to 
inexperienced investors. For example, the Short and Sure Guide to Railway Speculation 
advised that with ‘regards the purchase of shares in established lines we have simply to 
compare the market price of the share with the dividend which it pays
7’, and that for shares in 
a newly projected line the investor ‘must know the country through which the line is to pass, 
and its prospects as to traffic, or he must have good reason to depend on the character of the 
Provisional Committee
8’.  The Railway Investment Guide gave practical advice on how to 
subscribe to schemes and advised that share prices may be raised by a decision of the 
Parliamentary Committee in favour of the particular line, or by an amalgamation with a 
competitor
9
. However, these guides did not provide share tips on individual companies, nor 
did their sentiment change over time. In addition, evidence from subscriber lists and 
shareholder records suggests that only a small proportion of investors during the Mania could 
have been regarded as inexperienced (Campbell and Turner, 2012), so the impact of these 
publications may have been limited.  
Other sources for investors were compilations of factual information, such as Tuck’s 
Railway Shareholder Manual which provided details on the routes taken by particular 
railways, and relevant parliamentary bills. Although these publications may have been useful 
                                                     
5
 Economist, April 5, 1845, p.310, 
6
 Economist, October 4, 1845, p.949 
7
 Short and Sure Guide to Railway Speculation, 1845, p.5 
8
 Short and Sure Guide to Railway Speculation, 1845, p.9 
9
 Railway Investment Guide, 1845, p.13 
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to some individuals, they did not provide commentary on the prospects of firms or the stock 
market, and the surviving records suggest that by far the main source of information was the 
railway press which arose to satisfy the needs of railway shareholders (Simmons, 1991, p.43).  
Although we cannot know what investors at the time were thinking, we can infer from advice 
given in the investment pamphlets mentioned above, in the Railway Times, and in 
advertisements of new schemes, that dividends and forecasted dividends played a central role 
in the thinking of investors.        
 
3. Data 
To pursue our analysis, we have collected three types of data.  Firstly, we have considered the 
periodicals which were dedicated to the railway industry, and reported on it every week.  We 
have digitised every page of the Railway Times from 1843 to 1850 inclusive, and every page 
of the Economist’s railway section and its Railway Monitor supplement from their initial 
publication in January 1845 until the end of 1850.
10
  We have also collected the front page of 
the Economist from it was first published in September 1843 until 1850, to estimate the effect 
that media coverage of economic news may have had on stock returns.  Then, using OCR 
(Optical Character Recognition) technology, we converted each column and page into a 
series of text files which could be analysed. Each column was also manually categorised into 
editorials, letters to the editor, company and parliamentary reports, and adverts. 
Secondly, we searched online digital archives of The Times and the Economist for all 
editorials / lead articles which related to the railway market and industry from 1843 to 1850.
11
  
We then manually checked all of these results and assessed whether they focused on the 
                                                     
10
 The Economist published a railway section in its main paper between January 1845 and October 1845, and a 
supplement entitled the Railway Monitor from October 1845 onwards, but these are regarded as the same 
publication for this analysis. There were six weeks when full issues of the Railway Times, and three weeks when 
the Economist’s railway supplement, could not be located. It was assumed that during these weeks all variables 
had the same values as in the previous week. 
11
 By the 1840s, The Times was printing lists of stock prices (including railways) and giving a brief factual 
comment on activity in the money, equity and government debt markets. 
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railways, or just mentioned them briefly.  Using this method, we found 16 editorials in the 
Economist and 41 in The Times which concentrated on the railways.
12
   
Thirdly, to assess the effect of the press on the market, we hand collected railway 
stock prices and capitalisation data for the 417 weeks in the sample period from share price 
tables in the Railway Times.  In total, we found information on prices, par values and number 
of shares in issue for 591 ordinary stocks, belonging to 332 railway companies.  We have also 
collected similar data from the Course of the Exchange for the 22 largest non-railway 
company stocks traded on the London stock market.  Weekly value-weighted indices of 
returns were constructed for railways and non-railways using this data.  The weekly returns 
for each stock in the indices were weighted by the previous week’s market capitalisation.   
On a weekly basis, the total number of observations for when stocks were listed on 
the stock market (number of stocks * number of weeks listed) was 74,877.  The number of 
observations for which there was a weekly price, indicating that a trade had taken place at 
least once during that week, was 33,303 (44.4% of the total).  The cross-sectional analysis in 
Section 7 was completed on a monthly basis, and only included the primary asset type for 
each company.  On a monthly basis, there were 10,524 observations for listed companies, and 
5,667 observed prices (53.8% of the total).  If a price was not observed during a particular 
week or month it was assumed that the price did not change during that period, and the return 
was zero. 
 
4. Scale and positivity of railway press coverage 
To assess the coverage of the railway-specific periodicals during this episode presents the 
challenge of quantifying newspaper articles.  There are two possible approaches which can be 
used for this.  The first possibility is to use computer software which maintains an objective 
                                                     
12
 The editorials from The Times were obtained from the The Times Digital Archive. Several editorials occurred 
during the same week so the number of weeks in which an editorial occurred was 39. 
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and consistent approach to the scoring of different articles.  The second possibility is to assess 
the positivity of content by reading the articles and scoring them subjectively.  To ensure 
robustness in this analysis, we have used both approaches. 
 The use of computer software has several advantages over subjective assessment.  
Firstly, the assessor’s idea of what is positive and negative may change with every article 
read, making a systematic evaluation of the tone of articles difficult.  Secondly, with no 
predefined method of ascertaining whether articles are positive or negative, the decision is 
largely a subjective one, and this introduces the potential for bias.  Thirdly, given the 
complex nature of language, it would be difficult to construct manually a spectrum of article 
positivity, which is necessary for our analysis.  A possible solution to these difficulties is to 
quantify media content in a similar manner to Tetlock (2007), by putting each article through 
content analysis software.  By focusing on the positivity of articles, it is possible to avoid the 
problem that many words considered as negative in other contexts may not be negative in 
financial contexts (Loughran and McDonald, 2011).  
 Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) analyzes text files using a 4,500 word 
corpus to score language for certain linguistic and psychological features using an in-built 
psychosocial dictionary.  The main LIWC category of interest for our study is positivity; the 
in-built dictionary for this category has 406 words.  When an article is analyzed by LIWC, it 
is given a positive score, which is simply the percentage of words in the article which are 
designated as positive by LIWC’s in-built psychosocial dictionary.  We score the positivity of 
each article by dividing the number of positive words by the total number of words in the 
article minus all linguistic processes such as pronouns, articles, conjunctions etc.  Each 
available article between 1843 and 1850, in the Railway Times’ editorial section, the 
Economist’s railway supplement, and the Economist’s front page was analysed using this 
approach.  
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However, there are also several disadvantages to using computer software to score 
positivity.  Firstly, sentence structure is not captured, e.g., ‘no need for fear’ would most 
probably be interpreted as a negative phrase as 75% of the words used are in the negative 
dictionary.  Secondly, software does not distinguish between media reporting of past events, 
and forecasts of what is likely to happen in the future.  This makes it difficult to conclude 
whether the media has an impact on a ‘bubble’ because it conveys factual information, or 
because it makes optimistic predictions which hype the market and increase investor 
expectations.  Thirdly, the use of computer software cannot assess how relevant the positive 
words used in an article are to shareholders.  For example, an article may be discussing the 
reduction of fares charged by a railway, which would be positive for passengers, but not 
necessarily so for investors.  Fourthly, language use may have changed between the 1840s 
and today. 
 To overcome these difficulties we have also manually read articles and subjectively 
assessed positivity.  Given the time consuming nature of this process we have focused on the 
four year period around the market peak, namely October 1843 to October 1847. Each 
column of each article was given a score of +1 for positive content, 0 for neutral content, or -
1 for negative content, and the average across columns for each publication in each week was 
calculated. Separate scores have been given for the reporting of past events, and the 
forecasting of future developments.  We have also limited our assessment to those issues 
which were directly relevant to shareholders.   
 Before analyzing positivity, it is also informative to briefly consider the word count of 
each publication.  An analysis of all sections of the Railway Times, illustrates that it relied 
heavily upon advertising revenue from companies publishing prospectuses and raising 
capital: such advertising was on average 26.3% of the periodical’s weekly word count from 
1843 to 1850.  Table 2 shows that advertising was a particularly large proportion of the 
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Railway Times in 1845, the year when railway stocks appreciated the most.  Consequently, 
one could hypothesise that its editorial slant may have been biased, and they therefore had 
incentives to hype the market for railway shares.  On the other hand, the Economist did not 
face such incentives, and was actually sceptical about the state of the railway share market in 
the weeks leading up to its collapse.      
<<INSERT TABLE 2>> 
 Table 3 contains descriptive statistics of word count as well as the LIWC measure of 
the positivity of articles in the Railway Times’ editorial section, the railway supplement of the 
Economist and the front page of the Economist.  In terms of word count, the size of the 
average editorial section in the Railway Times decreased somewhat during 1844, possibly 
because the extent of space taken up by advertising increased dramatically during this period, 
as shown in Table 2.  The word count of the Economist’s railway section expanded 
dramatically in late 1845 when it commenced the publication of its Railway Monitor 
supplement.  After peaking in 1846, the Economist’s coverage of railways dropped 
substantially over the remainder of the decade. 
<<INSERT TABLE 3>> 
In terms of sentiment, using the LIWC software suggests that the positivity of the 
Railway Times’ editorial section almost tracked the railway stock index until mid-1848, 
whenever the two series diverge, as shown in Panel A of Figure 1.  The average positivity of 
the Railway Times’ editorial section was at its highest in 1845, when the Mania peaked, and 
in 1850, when railway prices were recovering from their trough.  The positivity of the 
Economist’s railway supplement started high in 1845, but declined until 1847, thereafter it 
increased until the end of the decade, as shown in Panel A of Figure 2.  The positivity of the 
Economist’s front page declined most dramatically in late 1846 and early 1847, as shown in 
Panel of Figure 3, when concerns began about the agricultural harvest and export of bullion, 
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which eventually led to the Commercial Crisis of 1847.  
<<INSERT FIGURES 1,2 and 3 >> 
Using the second approach, of subjective assessments, gives more insight into the 
differences between the tone of reporting, and the forecasts made, by each publication.  Panel 
B of Figure 1 suggests that the positivity of both reporting and forecasting by the Railway 
Times increased during the boom, but the tenor remained fairly restrained.  Even during the 
boom, the reporting often focused on neutral issues such as parliamentary procedure
13
, or on 
negative developments such as a proposed Parliamentary Bill which it referred to as the 
Railway Plunder Bill
14
, or on the damaging effect of competition between rival companies.
15
 
Although the forecasts made by the Railway Times were consistently more positive 
than their reporting of recent events, they tended to focus on the merits of a proposed scheme, 
rather than on the potential for short-term speculation.  For example, in their support of the 
Caledonian railway they said that ‘the traffic tables bear out to the full, and more, the original 
expectations of the promoters.’16  They argued that with regards the Manchester, Midland and 
Great Grimsby Junction railway, ‘for directness and shortness it is unequalled by any of the 
competing schemes.’17  Their assessments of proposed schemes could also be strongly 
critical, with one of the largest projects, the London and York railway, being referred to as a 
‘monster bubble.’18 
The positivity of both reporting and forecasting declined considerably during the 
market crash in the autumn of 1845, when much of the coverage focused on share price 
declines and the negative attitude of The Times to the railways.
19
  As share prices steadied, 
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 Railway Times, March 1, 1845, p.280 
14
 Railway Times, June 29, 1844, p. 713 
15
 Railway Times, October 19, 1844, p.1204 
16
 Railway Times, February 1, 1845, pp. 127-128 
17
 Railway Times, August 2, 1845, p.1161 
18
 Railway Times, March 15, 1845, p.362 
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the tone of reporting generally increased again, and by August 1846 the Railway Times 
argued that the ‘worst is past’20.  However, with the onset of the economic difficulties in 1847 
which were associated with the Commercial Crisis, positivity declined once more. 
 The positivity of the Economist’s railway supplement seems to be fairly independent of 
stock market changes, except for the substantial decline in positivity which occurred in the 
autumn of 1845 when railway share prices fell dramatically, as shown in Panel B of Figure 2.  
At this time it commented on the ‘Crisis in the Share Market’ and was keen to distinguish 
between the dividend-paying lines and the riskier projects which had yet to be constructed
21
.  
The Economist had consistently been wary of speculation in such projects and during the 
market crash they maintained that such companies ‘cannot be, under any circumstances, 
worth a premium’.22  As time progressed, the railway supplement became more focused on 
reporting events such as company meetings, and gave less editorial comment. 
 The front page of the Economist made little mention of movements in the stock market, 
or on individual firms, but it did comment extensively on economic changes which could 
have affected the financial performance of the railways and other companies.  The changes in 
positivity, shown in Panel B of Figure 3, illustrate the concerns about the economy which 
arose in the autumn of 1845, and the problems which occurred in 1847 related to the 
Commercial Crisis.  The timing of these declines suggests that at least some of the changes in 
railway share prices may have been related to changes in the economy. 
            
5. Did the railway press affect the market?   
To gauge whether the coverage of the Railway Times, or the Economist’s front page or 
railway supplement had an effect on the aggregate market for railway stocks, we incorporate 
measures on the amount and positivity of railway coverage into a time series model.  For the 
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 Railway Times, August 1, 1846, p.1058 
21
 Economist, November 8, 1845, p.1109 
22
 Economist, November 8, 1845, p.1109 
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first approach to quantifying media articles, using the LIWC software, and similar to Tetlock 
(2007), we use an autoregressive distributive lag (ADL) regression to incorporate the media 
variables into a model of stock returns with multiple lagged values to capture the inertia and 
delay present in the market.  Four lags of each variable are included, meaning that changes in 
one variable can have an impact on another variable up to one month later.  We include past 
returns of both the railway index and the non-railway index, and the media variables of word 
count and positive content as shown in Equation 1, with the results reported in Table 4. 
RailReturnt=α1 Lτ(RailReturnt)+γ1 Lτ(NonrailReturnt)+γ2 Lτ(WordCountt)+γ3 Lτ(Positivet) (1) 
where Lτ is a lag operator; RailReturnt is the weekly value-weighted return on the index of 
railway stocks in week t; NonrailReturnt is the weekly value-weighted return on the index of 
non-railway stocks in week t; WordCountt is the total number of words published in week t; 
and Positivet is the mean article positivity score for week t from LIWC.  We run separate 
Newey-West regression models for each publication for the period 1843 to 1850
23
 
 For the second approach to quantifying media content, using subjective assessment, we 
run a similar model but use different media variables, by including the measures of how 
positive the reporting and forecasting in each publication was, as shown in Equation 2, with 
the results reported in Table 5. 
RailReturnt=α1 Lτ(RailReturnt)+γ1 Lτ(NonrailReturnt)+γ2 Lτ(Reportingt)+γ3 Lτ(Forecastt) (2) 
where Lτ is a lag operator; RailReturnt is the weekly value-weighted return on the index of 
railway stocks in week t; NonrailReturnt is the weekly value-weighted return on the index of 
non-railway stocks in week t; Reportingt is a subjective assessment of how positive the 
reporting of recent events was in week t; and Forecastt is a subjective assessment of how 
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 The results using this approach for the sub-period between October 1843 and October 1847 are consistent 
with the main results from 1843 to 1850. 
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positive the forecasting of the future was in week t.  We run separate Newey-West regression 
models for each publication for the four years around the market peak, namely October 1843 
to October 1847. 
<<INSERT TABLES 4 and 5>> 
 From the various specifications shown in Tables 4 and 5, we find several key results. 
Firstly, there is evidence that changes in the stock market affected media sentiment. For the 
Railway Times, it appears that changes in both railway returns and non-railway returns 
affected how positive the content of editorials were in subsequent weeks (Column 4 of Table 
4), and that non-railway returns affected the positivity of reporting (Column 3 of Table 5).  
Similarly, for the front page of the Economist, non-railway returns affected the positivity of 
content (Column 12 of Table 4) and the positivity of reporting (Column 11 of Table 5).  
These findings suggest that events in the stock market and economy may have affected the 
tone of media coverage.  This can be seen most clearly around the time of the market crash in 
October 1845. Before the crash, the Railway Times remained confident about the market, but 
in the weeks after share prices started to fall, the editorials were forced to comment on the 
‘depression’ in railway shares.  These articles were defensive in tone about the prospects of 
the railway industry, and were extremely hostile to parties such as The Times whom they 
blamed for bearing the market.
24
  Similarly, the economic problems which occurred at this 
time, and which affected non-railway returns, led to less positive comment by both the 
Railway Times and the front page of the Economist. 
 Secondly, the reporting of recent events by the media may have affected stock returns. 
For the Railway Times, there is a suggestion that positive reporting of what had already 
happened resulted in higher railway stock returns in subsequent weeks (Column 1 of Table 
5).  This finding may also be supported by the evidence that changes in the amount of 
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 Railway Times, Editorials from October 18, 1845 – December 13, 1845, pp. 1962, 2057, 2137, 2185, 2233, 
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coverage, in both the Railway Times and the Economist’s railway supplement, affected 
railway stock returns (Columns 1 and 5 of Table 4).  Weeks when there was a lot of railway-
related news (and hence increased word count) may have been followed by larger changes in 
stock prices as investors responded to the new information.   
 Thirdly, there is no evidence that positive sentiment, as measured either by the LIWC 
software, or from a subjective assessment of forecasts, played any role in hyping railway 
stocks.  For the Railway Times, the publication which had the strongest motive to hype stocks 
due to its reliance on advertising by railway companies, and which could potentially have had 
the biggest impact on railway returns due to its large circulation amongst railway investors, 
both the positive content measure (Column 1 of Table 4) and the forecasting measure 
(Column 1 of Table 5) are insignificant in explaining railway stock returns.  Indeed, the lags 
of the forecasting measure have negative coefficients, suggesting that if there was any 
relationship, it was the opposite of what may have been expected from hyping.  The Railway 
Times may have tried to maintain confidence in the future of the railway market, but this was 
unsuccessful and railway stock prices continued to fall.  This conclusion may also be 
supported by the negative and significant coefficients which suggest that more positive 
content was followed by lower non-railway returns (Column 2 of Table 4), implying that 
economic conditions continued to deteriorate following positive editorials by the Railway 
Times.  There is some suggestion that the positivity of the Economist’s railway supplement 
may have had an impact on railway stock returns (Column 5 of Table 4), but the sign of the 
coefficients are inconclusive as to whether there was a positive or negative relationship.  
There is also no evidence that the sentiment of the front page of the Economist, or its 
forecasts, had any effect on railway stock returns (Column 9 of Table 4 and Column 9 of 
Table 5). 
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This section has focused on the long-term relationship between the railway press and 
the market for railway stocks.  Our results suggest that the media may have been affected by 
stock returns, and that media reporting of recent events may have had an influence on stock 
prices.  However, of most interest is the finding that the sentiment of the media had no impact 
in hyping railway stock prices, and cannot be blamed for exacerbating the Mania for 
investing in railway shares. 
 
6. Editorials of mainstream press and the bearing of the market 
Between 1843 and 1850, there were 39 weeks in which The Times published editorials 
concerning railways.  The initial articles during the boom tended to focus on the operation of 
the government’s Railway Department of the Board of Trade, which advised Parliament on 
sanctioning new railway proposals.  However, it issued its first alarm about the market for 
railway shares on July 1, 1845, four months prior to the market crash. It was concerned that 
too many railways were being promoted, and that subscribers to those schemes would be 
unable to pay the capital which would be required for construction.  It began and ended its 
article with the question ‘whence is to come all the money for the construction of the 
projected railways?’ 25  From this point on, The Times adopted a consistently hostile attitude 
to railway schemes.  The Railway Times argued that the antagonistic stance of The Times was 
responsible for the downturn, and for nine consecutive weeks, the Railway Times’ lead article 
was focused on attacking The Times for bearing the market
26
. 
Four weeks after the onset of the market crash, on November 17, as railway share 
prices continued to fall, The Times published a special supplement detailing the amount of 
capital which would be required by the 1,263 new railway schemes which were being 
promoted.  During the downturn, The Times continued to be critical of railways on topics 
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 The Times, July 1, 1845, p.4 
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 Railway Times, Editorials from October 18, 1845 – December 13, 1845, pp. 1962, 2057, 2137, 2185, 2233, 
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such as the progress of railway bills seeking authorisation, the raising of capital by railway 
companies, and the audit of railway accounts. 
The Economist published 16 front page editorials which discussed railways 
extensively.  The particular subject of each article varied throughout the course of the period, 
but the tone was consistently cautious, and generally negative, regarding railway share prices 
and the promotion of new railway schemes.  The Economist also discussed concerns about 
the effects of the payments of deposits on new railway projects on October 4, 1845, just a few 
weeks prior to the market crash.
27
  During this week, the Economist also began publication of 
its Railway Monitor supplement, which started with an extensive and detailed critique of the 
negative effects which the new railways would have.  Throughout the downturn, the 
Economist published numerous articles on the effects of the diversion of capital to the 
railways from other industries, the extent of railway liabilities from lines which had been 
authorised but which had not been constructed, and the discovery of fraud in the accounts of 
some railways. Although admitting the long-term benefits of the railway industry, these 
articles generally raised concerns about various aspects of railway finance. 
To determine if the editorials of The Times or the Economist had any impact on 
railway share prices, the return of an index of all railway shares has been calculated for the 
week subsequent to each editorial’s publication.  The mean and standard error of these 
returns were then measured, and a t-statistic calculated.  Table 6 shows that in the week when 
a railway editorial was published in The Times, the mean return was 0.38%, and for the 
Economist there was also an increase of 0.38%.  This suggests that railway share prices 
continued to increase despite the commentary by these newspapers. 
<< INSERT TABLE 6 >> 
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To analyse the robustness of these findings, alternative variations of the event study 
were considered.  To control for changes in the broader market, the return of the 22 largest 
non-railway firms was also estimated.  The mean excess return of the railway index minus the 
non-railway index in the week of an editorial was 0.39% for The Times, and 0.54% for the 
Economist.  The excess return of the railway index above the risk-free rate, measured by the 
yield on Consols, which were government debt perpetuities, was 0.31% and 0.32% for The 
Times and the Economist respectively.  
A fourth approach estimated the relationship between the railway industry and the rest 
of the market, and used this relationship to predict the expected return of the railway industry 
during a particular week.  The beta of the railway industry was calculated by regressing the 
weekly return of the railway index against the return of the non-railway index over the period 
1843-1850.  This beta, multiplied by the non-railway index, was then used to estimate the 
expected return for the event study.  The excess return using this measure was 0.51% for The 
Times and 0.69% for the Economist.  A variation on this approach, which used a thin-trading 
beta as per Dimson (1979), produced a similar finding.  All of the results in Table 6 suggest 
that although The Times and the Economist published particularly negative commentary on 
the railway industry, railway share prices continued to increase.  
Extending the event window does not change the key results.  Figure 4 plots the 
average returns around the publication date when all editorials are considered, and shows that 
for several weeks prior to publication, and immediately afterwards, railway share prices were 
increasing. Share prices tended to fall two weeks after the Economist editorials, but the 
cumulative returns after four weeks were not significantly different from zero.  
<< INSERT FIGURE 4 >> 
These findings suggest that the negativity of The Times and the Economist did not 
have an immediate impact in that they did not curtail or end the Mania.  This is consistent 
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with the observation that railway share prices continued to increase during the summer of 
1845, even when the scepticism of the mainstream media was already clear.  It could be 
argued that the articles issued by The Times and the Economist in October 1845 had a unique 
impact, compared to earlier or later editorials.  However, they were generally restating 
arguments which had already been made up to five months before.  A more likely explanation 
is that these October editorials simply coincided with changes in other variables which were 
the true cause of the crash.  Contemporaneous with these editorials, there was the onset of an 
agricultural crisis, and an unprecedented increase in the promotion of new railway schemes, 
both of which could have affected investor expectations.   
 
7. Media coverage of individual stocks 
The analysis thus far has focused on whether the tone of media coverage had an impact on 
stock returns.  However, it is also possible that the extent of coverage may also have played a 
role, as a stock which receives more attention may be more sought after by investors (Barber 
and Odean, 2008).  In this section, we test whether the amount of media coverage received by 
individual companies influenced the returns on their stocks.  If some stocks have been hyped, 
we might expect stocks with more coverage to have higher returns.  Alternatively, if some 
stocks have substantial media coverage, they may have a lower return as the media may act 
as an information disseminator for such stocks (Fang and Peress, 2009). 
To analyse this issue, the Railway Times and the Economist’s railway supplement 
have been examined to determine the extent of coverage of individual stocks.  Each of the 
34,264 columns in the Railway Times and the 1,022 columns of the Economist’s railway 
supplement was converted into text using OCR software, and the resultant output was then 
searched for the names of all of the railway companies which were listed on the London stock 
exchange at any time during the period 1843 to 1850.  
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Table 7 presents summary statistics on an annual basis for the amount of coverage in 
the cross-section of stocks.  An examination of coverage in the Railway Times, excluding the 
share price tables, suggests that an average of 85.1% of stocks were mentioned each year. For 
the Economist’s railway supplement, coverage was generally lower, but still 68.3% of stocks 
were mentioned.  For those companies which received some coverage, the number of 
columns in which they were mentioned varied widely, from a minimum of just one, to a 
maximum of 4,810 columns for the Great Western Railway (one of the largest railways at the 
time), which represented 14.0% of all columns. 
<< INSERT TABLE 7 >> 
The Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression analysis reported in Table 8 relates the 
total number of columns in which a particular stock was mentioned each year, to other 
variables for that firm, such as size, the par/price ratio (a proxy for the book/market ratio), 
annual return, and absolute annual return.  The results suggest that size had a highly 
significant relationship with the extent of media coverage, whilst the absolute annual return 
was also a factor.  This is consistent with the expectation that larger firms, and those with 
more volatile returns, were mentioned most often. 
<< INSERT TABLE 8 >> 
The extent of media coverage for each railway was then measured by the number of 
columns in which that railway had been mentioned within a particular month.  To analyse 
whether media coverage had an impact on returns, each stock was assigned to one of three 
portfolios each month, in an approach similar to Fang and Peress (2009).  No-media-coverage 
firms were those which were not mentioned at all.  The median number of columns of the 
remaining sample was then calculated for each month.  Low-coverage stocks were defined as 
those which were below the median, whilst extensive-coverage stocks had above median 
coverage. 
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The monthly return of each stock was calculated as the change in the log of price, 
controlling for changes in capital (as measured by changes in the par value of the stock).  The 
return in the subsequent month was calculated for each portfolio, by using a weighted 
average of returns for the individual companies within that portfolio.  Only companies which 
traded during a particular month were included, resulting in a total of 5,667 observations. 
Market indices were then constructed from these monthly returns.  As can be seen from 
Figure 5, for most of the sample period, extensive-media-coverage firms outperformed low-
coverage firms, which themselves outperformed no coverage firms.  
<< INSERT FIGURE 5 >> 
To analyse the significance of these differences, the average across time of each 
portfolio’s monthly returns was then calculated.  A t-test was performed to determine if there 
was a significant difference in returns between extensive and no-media-coverage firms.  
Table 9 suggests that no-media-coverage firms earned significantly lower returns overall. 
<< INSERT TABLE 9 >> 
This analysis was then performed on various sorts of the data, by allocating firms into 
portfolios based on their size, book/market value, current return, previous return, price and 
liquidity.  Size was measured by market capitalisation, book/market value by the par/price 
ratio, current return and previous return by the change in the log of the price for a given 
month, price by the last traded share price, and liquidity by the number of days during the 
month that a stock had traded.  
For each variable, each company was ranked, and then allocated into one of three 
categories, with category zero being the lowest, and category two being the highest in each 
instance.
28
 As can be seen from Table 9, when the analysis of no-minus-extensive-media-
coverage returns is performed on these subsamples, the difference is significant at the five 
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percent level in 12 of the 54 tests (five for the overall period, one for the boom and six for the 
downturn). 10 out of the 12 significant differences suggest that no-media-coverage firms 
earned lower returns than extensive-media-coverage firms. 
However, this analysis does not control for other risk factors. Fang and Peress (2009) 
suggest calculating the returns of a portfolio which is long on no media coverage stocks and 
short on extensive media coverage stocks, which we refer to as No Minus Extensive (NME).  
The returns on this portfolio are then regressed against the market return minus the risk-free 
rate, and returns on a portfolio which is long on small stocks and short on big stocks (SMB), 
a portfolio which is long on high book/market stocks and short on low book/market stocks 
(HML), and a portfolio which is long on illiquid stocks and short on the most liquid stocks 
(IMM).  The constant from this regression reveals the size and significance of the returns on 
the NME portfolio after controlling for other risk factors, which will indicate whether there 
was a premium on extensive-media-coverage firms after other factors have been considered. 
To pursue this analysis for the Railway Mania, the ranking and categorisation of 
companies, discussed above with regards to Table 9, was repeated and the NME portfolio 
was calculated by subtracting the returns in the subsequent month for extensive-media-
coverage stocks from those on no-coverage stocks.  Similarly, the SMB portfolio was 
constructed by subtracting the returns in the next month for large stocks from those on small, 
the HML portfolio was estimated by subtracting the return in the following month for high 
book/value stocks from those with a low book/value, and the IMM portfolio was formed by 
subtracting the returns in the next month for the most liquid stocks from illiquid stocks.  
The regression results shown in Table 10 indicate that none of the risk factors had a 
significant relationship with the NME portfolio during the boom.  The constant from these 
regressions are also insignificant, which implies that there was no significant difference 
between no-media and extensive-media stocks, once the other characteristics of these firms 
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have been controlled for.  For the downturn, and for the period as a whole, there was a 
significant positive relationship between SMB and NME, and a significant negative 
relationship between HML and NME.  However, the constant is not significant in any of 
these specifications, indicating that there was not a significant difference in returns for the 
NME portfolio after risk factors have been controlled for. 
<< INSERT TABLE 10>> 
These results suggest that although more extensive media coverage firms earned 
higher returns during the boom phase of the Railway Mania, and lower returns during the 
downturn, this was largely due to differences in the characteristics of those firms, rather than 
the actual volume of media coverage. 
 Overall, the findings of this section suggest that high-media-coverage stocks earned 
higher returns than stocks with no media coverage, but that risk factors accounted for this 
difference.  This finding differs from that for the modern US market as documented by Fang 
and Peress (2009), who find that there is a premium for no-media-coverage stocks.  This 
difference between their study and ours may arise because no-media-coverage railways were 
small local companies, which raised their capital from investors in the immediate locality 
(Broadbridge, 1968, p.193).  Consequently, investors had sufficient information on the stocks 
of these companies, and there was no need for a no-media-coverage premium.  
Perhaps of more interest with regards the relationship between the media and a 
bubble, the results also imply that individual stocks were not successfully hyped by the 
media.  Although those firms which received the most coverage tended to earn higher returns, 
this was due to standard risk factors, and not due to a psychological bias on the part of 
investors which could have led to certain stocks being more sought after simply because they 
received more attention. 
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8. Role of the Media during the Mania 
Our findings above suggest that the media did not play a major role in driving investor 
sentiment during the Mania.  This is consistent with the argument of Campbell (2012), that 
the asset price reversal during the Railway Mania was driven by changes to future cash flows 
and ultimately dividends.  As can be seen from Figure 6, during the boom phase of the 
Mania, railways increased their dividends.  Although dividends remained high for about 18 
months after the fall in railway stock prices commenced, they began to decrease steadily from 
1847 onwards, falling from a high of seven percent in 1847 to three percent by 1850.   
The collapse of the market for railway shares in October 1845 may have occurred 
because investors began to realise that dividends would not remain at high levels in the 
longer term.  The immediate signal which may have led them to revise their expectations was 
the onset of a poor agricultural harvest, which threatened economic growth, and the dramatic 
rise in the promotion of new railway schemes in the late summer and early fall of 1845, 
which followed the abolition of the Railway Board in July 1845, whose task it had been to 
ration railway charters.  The word count of adverts which ran in the Railway Times can be 
regarded as a measure of promotional activity, as the vast majority of adverts at this time 
were aimed at attracting subscribers to invest in new railway schemes, and as can be seen 
from Figure 7, the promotion of new railway companies spiked sharply in the fall of 1845.  
This rapid expansion threatened the profitability of the railway industry as many of these 
companies were going to compete with existing railway lines.  When investors foresaw that 
competition from new railways would diminish future cash flows and ultimately the 
dividends of existing railways, the market for railway stocks crashed.         
<< INSERT FIGURES 6 & 7>> 
What role did the media play in this explanation for the Mania?  Although the media 
may not have hyped the Mania, in the absence of other channels, it most definitely played a 
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role in disseminating fundamental information in the form of company and parliamentary 
reports to investors.  As can be seen from Table 2, nearly half of the content in the average 
issue of the Railway Times was in the form of company and parliamentary reports.  In other 
words, the railway periodicals laid facts before investors, which enabled them to estimate the 
future cash flows of railway companies. 
The media also played a role through advertising new railway schemes and by 
enabling promoters to reach a disparate group of individuals seeking outlets for their savings. 
These adverts were essentially short prospectuses, detailing the proposed route for a new 
railway line, the local businessmen and gentry who supported the scheme, the financial and 
public advantages which would result, and an application form which would allow interested 
readers to subscribe for shares.  As can be seen from Table 2, the adverts placed by railway 
promoters constituted a substantial proportion of the content of the Railway Times, with over 
half of the total content in 1845 consisting of such adverts.
29
  It is possible that by allowing 
new railway projects to provide such information, and by making it easy to invest in new 
schemes, the media indirectly facilitated the promotion boom in new railway lines. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
Media coverage of the market for railway stocks grew during the boom phase of the British 
Railway Mania and declined shortly after the market peak.  However, we find no evidence of 
the railway press hyping their reporting.  This finding may be consistent with Gentzkow and 
Shapiro (2006) as the lack of hype may be attributable to the intense competition in the 
market for railway periodicals and the sources of ex post news verification in the form of The 
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 A positivity measure was not estimated for adverts as new railway companies tended to promote themselves 
by providing long lists of prominent businessmen and nobility who were supporting the schemes. These names 
are regarded as neutral from a linguistic viewpoint so the measure of positivity does not entirely capture the 
nature of the adverts. Another difficulty is that although the sample size of advertising is very large during the 
peak in prices, it is very small at the very beginning and end of the period, so the mean may more easily be 
biased. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
30 
 
Times and other constituents of the national press.  Reader (and investor) heterogeneity may 
also have contributed to the lack of bias or hype (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005). 
Our evidence suggests that the media did not play a major role in propagating (or 
bringing to an end) one of the ‘greatest bubbles in history’.  The editorial content of the 
railway specific media did not boost stock returns during the boom, and the opinion pieces of 
The Times and the Economist did not cause the market crash.  Although those companies 
which received greater coverage also experienced a greater price reversal, this was primarily 
due to other risk factors.  The media may have played some role in the Mania by 
disseminating information, but it had little influence on investors via its editorial opinion 
pieces.  
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Table 1. Leading London Newspapers and Periodicals in the 1840s 
 
 
Established Frequency 
1845 circulation 
(est) 
1850 circulation 
(est) 
     
     
The Times 1785 Daily 8,100,000 11,900,000 
Morning Herald 1780 Daily 2,018,025 1,139,000 
Morning Chronicle 1769 Daily 1,554,000 912,547 
Lloyds Weekly London 1842 Weekly 2,777,432 2,559,000 
Illustrated London News 1842 Weekly 2,532,010 3,467,007 
Railway Times 1837 Weekly 355,350 85,700 
Herepath’s Railway Journal 1835 Weekly 234,500 98,300 
Railway Record 1844 Weekly 186,500 31,750 
Economist 1843 Weekly 150,500 199,000 
     
Sources: The circulation data is from Parliamentary Papers (1852) and is based on the one penny stamp duty paid on each 
copy of the newspaper which was published.  The date of establishment is from North (1997). 
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Table 2. Average Weekly Breakdown of Railway Times Content 
 
 
Adverts 
 
(%) 
Company and 
parliamentary reports 
(%) 
Letters from 
readers 
(%) 
Editorial 
 
(%) 
Word count 
 
 
1843 15.0 42.5 19.4 23.1 46,256.7 
1844 31.8 43.5 8.2 16.4 53,841.8 
1845 54.9 33.1 4.1 7.9 81,787.8 
1846 23.6 57.5 6.1 12.8 65,551.9 
1847 19.1 57.3 7.8 15.9 53,391.9 
1848 16.5 54.0 11.8 17.8 43,832.0 
1849 14.1 62.9 7.2 15.8 42,003.1 
1850 12.0 59.0 9.5 19.5 40,538.5 
1843-50 26.3 49.8 8.6 15.2 53,477.2 
      Notes: Each column within the Railway Times was manually categorised according to its content. Optical Character 
Recognition (OCR) was then used to generate text files which were fed into the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 
software to produce the word count of articles from each section of the periodical. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Scale and Positivity of Media Coverage, 1843-50 
 
Panel A: Railway Times News and Editorial section 
 
Positive words (%) Word count 
  Mean Median Std. Dev. Max. Min. Mean Median 
1843 10.2 10.1 0.9 12.0 8.1 10,705.6 10,803.0 
1844 11.0 10.9 1.2 13.7 8.7 8,834.3 9,171.5 
1845 11.6 11.7 1.5 14.7 7.8 6,430.7 6,357.0 
1846 11.4 11.3 1.3 14.0 8.7 8,410.6 7,766.0 
1847 10.7 10.8 1.2 13.6 8.0 8,474.5 6,741.0 
1848 10.3 10.5 1.4 12.9 7.2 7,800.8 6,824.0 
1849 10.8 10.9 1.2 13.0 7.8 6,638.0 6,207.5 
1850 11.6 11.6 1.4 14.9 8.8 7,905.2 7,409.5 
1843-50 10.9 10.9 1.4 14.9 7.2 8,150.7 7,271.0 
 
Panel B: Economist’s Railway Supplement 
 
Positive words (%) Word count 
  Mean Median Std. Dev. Max. Min. Mean Median 
1845 14.5 13.7 3.5 25.8 8.4 3,055.1 1,088.0 
1846 12.1 11.8 1.5 15.7 9.0 7,032.6 6,332.0 
1847 12.0 12.3 2.7 19.6 6.8 3,189.4 2,432.0 
1848 13.6 13.0 3.3 31.0 9.2 2,163.8 1,682.0 
1849 14.9 14.6 3.9 29.7 7.9 947.3 747.0 
1850 16.3 15.7 4.3 29.5 8.2 737.5 669.0 
1845-50 13.9 13.2 3.6 31.0 6.8 2,854.7 1,389.5 
 
Panel C: Economist’s Front Page 
 
Positive words (%) Word count 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev Max. Min Mean Median 
1843 10.3 10.1 1.8 13.8 7.4 4,051.1 3,616.5 
1844 11.0 10.5 1.8 15.8 7.5 4,246.3 3,685.5 
1845 10.5 10.4 2.1 15.3 5.2 3,650.8 3,455.0 
1846 10.0 10.0 2.2 13.7 5.1 3,745.5 3,415.0 
1847 10.4 10.5 1.7 14.5 7.6 4,277.2 3,559.0 
1848 10.7 10.6 1.8 15.0 7.1 4,213.9 3,386.0 
1849 10.7 10.8 2.0 14.6 6.6 3,753.9 3,391.0 
1850 10.7 10.4 2.3 16.8 6.8 4,137.0 3,360.5 
1843-50 10.6 10.5 2.0 16.8 5.1 4,006.5 3,481.0 
Notes: Word count calculated using Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC).  Positive content is the percentage of 
positive words in an article divided by the total psychological processes word count as classified by LIWC’s in-built 
dictionary. 
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Table 4. Newey-West Regressions of Quantitative Measures of Media Coverage and Stock Market Performance, 1843 to 1850 
   Railway Times  Economist Railway Monitor  Economist Front Page 
   Railway 
Return 
(1) 
Non-Rail 
Return 
(2) 
Word Count 
 
(3) 
Positive 
Content 
(4) 
 Railway 
Return 
(5) 
Non-Rail 
Return 
(6) 
Word Count 
 
(7) 
Positive 
Content 
(8) 
 Railway 
Return 
(9) 
Non-Rail 
Return 
(10) 
Word Count 
 
(11) 
Positive 
Content 
(12) 
                 
Railway Returnt-1   0.193*** 0.052*** -0.131 0.055  0.160*** 0.032* 0.147 0.084  0.197*** 0.050*** 0.191 0.074 
   (0.053) (0.015) (0.812) (0.042)  (0.059) (0.017) (0.638) (0.125)  (0.053) (0.015) (0.394) (0.065) 
Railway Returnt-2   0.045 -0.004 1.013 0.077*  0.060 0.000 1.320* -0.120  0.057 -0.003 -0.058 -0.029 
   (0.065) (0.012) (0.768) (0.044)  (0.073) (0.014) (0.682) (0.090)  (0.066) (0.013) (0.358) (0.053) 
Railway Returnt-3   0.076 -0.006 0.644 0.030  0.103 -0.010 -0.951* 0.039  0.090 -0.004 -0.283 -0.064 
   (0.072) (0.018) (0.877) (0.034)  (0.078) (0.019) (0.568) (0.102)  (0.073) (0.017) (0.346) (0.062) 
Railway Returnt-4   0.094 0.018 0.227 0.047  0.120 0.018 -0.444 0.240**  0.114 0.010 -0.711 -0.109 
   (0.071) (0.019) (0.904) (0.041)  (0.078) (0.021) (0.493) (0.102)  (0.075) (0.020) (0.454) (0.076) 
χ2   6.85*** 3.05** 0.53 3.63***  6.60*** 1.02 1.33 1.90  7.18*** 3.00** 0.81 1.25 
p-value   (0.000) (0.017) (0.714) (0.006)  (0.000) (0.395) (0.259) (0.110)  (0.000) (0.019) (0.522) (0.290) 
Non-Railway Returnt-1   0.164 0.085 -1.527 -0.261*  0.133 0.157** -0.223 0.067  0.121 0.091 0.018 0.440** 
   (0.173) (0.070) (3.938) (0.137)  (0.222) (0.066) (2.150) (0.340)  (0.183) (0.070) (1.342) (0.173) 
Non-Railway Returnt-2   -0.082 0.025 -7.644** 0.065  -0.062 -0.033 -1.816 0.489  -0.123 0.018 1.883 -0.300* 
   (0.192) (0.059) (3.087) (0.146)  (0.241) (0.070) (1.387) (0.322)  (0.201) (0.067) (1.230) (0.176) 
Non-Railway Returnt-3   -0.246 0.049 -5.141 -0.162  -0.442* 0.054 2.750* -0.568*  -0.321 0.018 -0.402 0.244 
   (0.170) (0.063) (3.812) (0.166)  (0.240) (0.059) (1.516) (0.336)  (0.208) (0.068) (1.291) (0.204) 
Non-Railway Returnt-4   -0.251 0.047 2.874 -0.124  -0.481** -0.000 -0.056 -0.336  -0.389* 0.079 1.410 0.221 
   (0.179) (0.066) (2.900) (0.108)  (0.242) (0.058) (1.464) (0.349)  (0.214) (0.064) (1.225) (0.175) 
χ2   1.80 1.39 3.05** 2.18*  3.72*** 2.16* 1.14 1.25  2.44** 1.84 1.00 3.00** 
p-value   (0.128) (0.237) (0.017) (0.07)  (0.006) (0.074) (0.336) (0.291)  (0.047) (0.120) (0.406) (0.019) 
Word Countt-1   0.005** 0.001* 0.226*** -0.004**  -0.006 -0.002 0.543*** -0.005  0.009 0.001 0.063 -0.002 
   (0.002) (0.001) (0.048) (0.002)  (0.006) (0.002) (0.063) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.002) (0.052) (0.008) 
Word Countt-2   0.001 -0.002** 0.138*** -0.001  -0.019** -0.002 0.268*** -0.019*  0.007 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.003) (0.001) (0.051) (0.002)  (0.009) (0.003) (0.077) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.002) (0.058) (0.008) 
Word Countt-3   0.006** 0.002* 0.096** 0.004*  0.010 0.002 0.118 -0.002  0.006 -0.001 0.129** -0.006 
   (0.002) (0.001) (0.046) (0.002)  (0.009) (0.002) (0.074) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.002) (0.061) (0.008) 
Word Countt-4   -0.002 0.000 0.062 -0.004**  0.009 0.000 -0.012 0.006  -0.001 0.002 0.025 0.002 
   (0.003) (0.001) (0.049) (0.002)  (0.009) (0.002) (0.098) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.002) (0.047) (0.008) 
χ2   2.49** 2.28* 17.83*** 3.11**  3.37** 1.48 168.85*** 3.06**  1.17 0.30 1.86 0.25 
p-value   (0.043) (0.060) (0.000) (0.015)  (0.010) (0.209) (0.000) (0.017)  (0.322) (0.881) (0.117) (0.908) 
Positive Contentt-1   0.045 -0.004 -1.575 0.091*  0.041 0.012 -0.070 0.112  0.043 0.002 0.277 0.073 
   (0.064) (0.024) (1.238) (0.051)  (0.029) (0.009) (0.173) (0.069)  (0.041) (0.014) (0.401) (0.052) 
Positive Contentt-2   -0.051 -0.047** 0.263 0.131***  -0.041 0.007 -0.088 0.208***  -0.006 0.006 -0.559* 0.051 
   (0.068) (0.019) (0.975) (0.044)  (0.028) (0.009) (0.179) (0.054)  (0.043) (0.012) (0.303) (0.054) 
Positive Contentt-3   0.031 0.015 1.663 0.184***  -0.036 -0.016* 0.336 0.014  -0.003 -0.003 -0.185 0.081 
   (0.057) (0.021) (1.206) (0.047)  (0.028) (0.010) (0.217) (0.069)  (0.040) (0.012) (0.371) (0.059) 
Positive Contentt-4   0.056 0.025 -2.519** 0.046  0.020 -0.004 0.098 0.092  0.081* 0.020 -0.131 -0.014 
   (0.071) (0.018) (1.004) (0.047)  (0.028) (0.008) (0.224) (0.072)  (0.046) (0.014) (0.365) (0.051) 
χ2   0.74 2.37* 2.78** 10.82***  2.08* 1.19 0.73 5.61***  1.02 0.93 1.03 1.83 
p-value   (0.565) (0.052) (0.027) (0.000)  (0.083) (0.314) (0.575) (0.000)  (0.397) (0.446) (0.391) (0.122) 
Constant   -0.016 0.001 0.629*** 0.064***  0.003 0.001 -0.014 0.086***  -0.021* -0.003 0.376*** 0.088*** 
   (0.012) (0.004) (0.196) (0.009)  (0.006) (0.002) (0.042) (0.019)  (0.011) (0.002) (0.068) (0.011) 
Obs.   413 413 413 413  308 308 308 308  379 379 379 379 
Notes: Where Railway Returnt-n denotes the weekly return of a value-weighted index of railway stocks, Non-Railway Returnt-n denotes the weekly return of a value-weighted index of a sample of non-railway stocks, Word Countt-n denotes the weekly 
word count of the respective media sections, and Positive Contentt-n denotes the weekly positive score of the content. χ
2 values represent Granger-causality results testing the joint significance of all lags for a given variable. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Economist Front Page began publication in September 1843, the Economist Railway Section/Monitor began publication in January 1845, whilst the Railway Times is examined for the full sample period 
beginning in 1843, and ending in 1850. 
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Table 5. Newey-West Regressions of Subjective Assessments of Media Coverage and Stock Market Performance, Oct 1843 to Oct 1847 
   Railway Times  Economist Railway Monitor  Economist Front Page 
   Railway 
Return 
(1) 
Non-Rail 
Return 
(2) 
Reporting 
 
(3) 
Forecast 
 
(4) 
 Railway 
Return 
(5) 
Non-Rail 
Return 
(6) 
Reporting 
 
(7) 
Forecast 
 
(8) 
 Railway 
Return 
(9) 
Non-Rail 
Return 
(10) 
Reporting 
 
(11) 
Forecast 
 
(12) 
                  
Railway Returnt-1   0.086 0.039* -0.151 0.961  0.019 0.021 -1.441 0.162  0.044 0.040** -1.469 -0.883 
   (0.079) (0.021) (0.850) (0.740)  (0.097) (0.022) (1.382) (0.393)  (0.080) (0.018) (1.605) (0.751) 
Railway Returnt-2   0.066 0.001 1.724** -0.023  0.106 0.014 1.026 0.241  0.049 -0.005 0.637 -0.652 
   (0.080) (0.020) (0.785) (0.729)  (0.100) (0.026) (0.683) (0.445)  (0.078) (0.018) (1.614) (0.586) 
Railway Returnt-3   0.127 0.017 -0.321 0.043  0.115 -0.007 -0.524 0.199  0.086 0.006 1.585 0.646 
   (0.093) (0.024) (0.887) (0.566)  (0.106) (0.023) (0.857) (0.357)  (0.092) (0.022) (1.400) (1.196) 
Railway Returnt-4   0.034 0.012 0.432 1.554*  0.063 0.023 0.964 0.167  0.021 0.018 3.945** -0.527 
   (0.106) (0.034) (0.964) (0.871)  (0.123) (0.040) (0.946) (0.469)  (0.104) (0.030) (1.533) (0.840) 
χ2   1.74 1.12 1.45 1.84  1.19 0.77 1.12 0.61  0.86 1.26 1.82 0.68 
p-value   (0.143) (0.348) (0.220) (0.123)  (0.319) (0.548) (0.348) (0.658)  (0.490) (0.289) (0.127) (0.604) 
Non-Railway Returnt-1   0.285 0.097 2.986 -1.901  0.354 0.216* 3.323 0.418  0.116 0.082 10.237* 1.396 
   (0.284) (0.115) (4.217) (1.855)  (0.396) (0.128) (3.265) (0.746)  (0.238) (0.089) (5.288) (4.110) 
Non-Railway Returnt-2   -0.015 -0.014 1.813 -1.951  -0.282 -0.215 -1.584 -1.232  -0.128 -0.047 -12.427 1.361 
   (0.304) (0.111) (5.066) (3.310)  (0.432) (0.166) (3.688) (1.694)  (0.315) (0.124) (9.281) (4.465) 
Non-Railway Returnt-3   -0.052 0.046 7.253** -2.584  -0.042 0.146 -0.567 0.424  -0.112 0.033 -1.354 -1.089 
   (0.320) (0.098) (3.454) (2.840)  (0.553) (0.146) (3.089) (1.100)  (0.279) (0.101) (7.209) (3.122) 
Non-Railway Returnt-4   -0.397 0.233** -2.351 -1.624  -0.832** -0.023 2.616 1.542  -0.320 0.212*** 10.607** 6.237 
   (0.265) (0.091) (3.820) (2.229)  (0.386) (0.118) (4.243) (1.175)  (0.303) (0.076) (5.006) (4.231) 
χ2   1.52 4.16*** 2.16* 1.02  1.76 1.45 0.38 0.65  0.45 3.61*** 2.06* 0.62 
p-value   (0.198) (0.003) (0.075) (0.399)  (0.141) (0.223) (0.822) (0.629)  (0.774) (0.007) (0.088) (0.647) 
Reportingt-1   0.001 -0.003* 0.076 0.016  0.007 0.000 0.121 -0.006  0.004 0.001 0.112 0.009 
   (0.004) (0.002) (0.064) (0.045)  (0.009) (0.002) (0.091) (0.020)  (0.004) (0.001) (0.097) (0.047) 
Reportingt-2   0.012** -0.000 0.094 0.063  -0.003 -0.001 0.098 0.010  0.008** 0.001* 0.213** 0.100 
   (0.005) (0.001) (0.071) (0.048)  (0.007) (0.002) (0.069) (0.015)  (0.003) (0.001) (0.089) (0.063) 
Reportingt-3   0.000 0.000 -0.047 -0.050  -0.005 0.000 -0.049 -0.022  0.000 -0.001 0.040 -0.042 
   (0.005) (0.002) (0.095) (0.047)  (0.008) (0.002) (0.075) (0.032)  (0.003) (0.001) (0.075) (0.075) 
Reportingt-4   0.004 -0.001 -0.034 0.042  -0.001 -0.001 -0.030 0.049  -0.001 -0.000 -0.099 -0.091 
   (0.004) (0.001) (0.092) (0.053)  (0.008) (0.002) (0.090) (0.050)  (0.005) (0.002) (0.114) (0.076) 
χ2   2.02* 1.18 1.09 0.91  0.25 0.13 0.96 0.37  1.75 0.99 2.67** 0.69 
p-value   (0.093) (0.322) (0.363) (0.458)  (0.910) (0.970) (0.432) (0.832)  (0.141) (0.415) (0.034) (0.601) 
Forecastingt-1   -0.010 0.000 0.150 0.155**  0.036 0.008 0.663** -0.001  0.001 0.000 -0.102 0.224* 
   (0.006) (0.002) (0.095) (0.074)  (0.038) (0.007) (0.323) (0.093)  (0.005) (0.002) (0.202) (0.126) 
Forecastingt-2   -0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.038  0.003 -0.003 -0.014 -0.147  -0.005 -0.001 -0.032 0.045 
   (0.007) (0.002) (0.102) (0.055)  (0.028) (0.004) (0.153) (0.118)  (0.006) (0.001) (0.078) (0.046) 
Forecastingt-3   -0.012 0.001 -0.039 0.038  0.017 -0.001 -0.366 0.035  0.014* 0.004** 0.083 0.151 
   (0.009) (0.002) (0.086) (0.060)  (0.015) (0.004) (0.230) (0.067)  (0.007) (0.002) (0.156) (0.108) 
Forecastingt-4   0.003 0.000 0.132 0.107  0.019 0.002 0.138 -0.056  0.008 -0.003 -0.041 0.075 
   (0.007) (0.002) (0.096) (0.083)  (0.018) (0.003) (0.180) (0.048)  (0.006) (0.003) (0.097) (0.068) 
χ2    1.80 0.14 1.26 2.67**  0.87 0.38 7.05*** 0.86  1.89 1.32 0.62 1.30 
p-value    (0.130) (0.969) (0.288) (0.034)  (0.486) (0.824) (0.000) (0.490)  (0.114) (0.265) (0.647) (0.271) 
Constant   0.003* -0.001 -0.100*** 0.032*  -0.002 -0.001** -0.002 0.000  0.002 -0.000 -0.061** -0.025 
   (0.002) (0.000) (0.024) (0.018)  (0.002) (0.000) (0.018) (0.005)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.028) (0.016) 
Obs.   209 209 209 209  143 143 143 143  209 209 209 209 
Notes: Where Railway Returnt-n denotes the weekly return of a value-weighted index of railway stocks, Non-Railway Returnt-n denotes the weekly return of a value-weighted index of a sample of non-railway stocks, Reportingt-n denotes a subjective 
assessment of the positivity of the reporting of recent events, and Forecastingt-n denotes a subjective assessment of the positivity of the forecasts made, in the respective newspapers. χ
2 values represent Granger-causality results testing the joint 
significance of all lags for a given variable. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Economist Railway Section/Monitor began publication in January 1845, whilst the Economist Front Page and  Railway Times are 
examined for the sample period beginning in October 1843, and ending in October 1847. 
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Table 6. Event Studies for The Times and Economist Editorials 
 
Abnormal Return = Railways’ Return Minus: 
 
 Zero 
Non-
Railway 
Return 
Risk-free 
Beta* 
Non-
Railway 
Return 
Beta* 
Non-
Railway 
Return 
with lags 
The Times 
N=39 Mean 0.38% 0.39% 0.31% 0.51% 0.47% 
 SE 0.26% 0.26% 0.26% 0.26% 0.24% 
 t-test 1.45 1.50 1.21 1.96 1.93 
  
     
Economist 
N=16 Mean 0.38% 0.54% 0.32% 0.69% 0.81% 
 SE 0.22% 0.19% 0.22% 0.19% 0.23% 
 t-test 1.74 2.86 1.45 3.68 3.51 
  
     
Notes: Event window of one week. The Times published 41 editorials concerning the railways, but in some 
cases these were during the same week, so there are 39 weeks of events. Railway return calculated as the 
percentage change in a railway market index consisting of all railway stocks weighted by market capitalisation. 
Non-railway return calculated based on an index of the twenty-two largest non-railway stocks by market 
capitalisation. Risk-free rate calculated from the yield on Consols, which were government debt perpetuities. 
Beta is calculated by regressing the railway return minus the risk-free rate, against the non-railway return 
minus risk-free rate for the full sample period. The beta with lags also includes lags of the non-railway return in 
the estimation of beta, in line with the Dimson (1979) thin-trading correction. 
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Table 7. Extent of Coverage of the Cross-Section of Stocks 
 
 
% of stocks covered at least 
once per year 
 
Number of Columns in which a 
particular company was mentioned  
 
 
    
 
Railway  
Times 
Economist’s 
railway 
supplement  
Mean Median Max Min 
    
 
    1843 92.1% 0.0% 
 
 97.5 42.0 528.0 1.0 
1844 87.6% 0.0% 
 
 61.4 23.5 585.0 1.0 
1845 88.2% 52.5% 
 
 58.2 12.0 1307.0 1.0 
1846 81.0% 72.2% 
 
 62.9 29.5 916.0 1.0 
1847 86.8% 73.0% 
 
 68.8 40.0 704.0 1.0 
1848 90.9% 73.6% 
 
 70.2 37.0 610.0 1.0 
1849 92.9% 51.0% 
 
 61.2 29.5 507.0 1.0 
1850 87.7% 52.8% 
 
 65.0 24.0 573.0 1.0 
    
 
    
1843-50 85.1% 68.3% 
 
 205.2 42.0 4810.0 1.0 
    
 
    Notes: ‘Percentage of stocks covered at least once per year’ refers to how many railway companies were 
mentioned at least once during a particular year, as a percentage of all stocks listed on the London Stock 
Exchange during that year. ‘Number of Columns in which a particular company was mentioned’, provides 
descriptive statistics across companies, for how many columns each company was mentioned in during a year, 
for those companies mentioned at least once. 
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Table 8. Fama-MacBeth Regressions Explaining the  
Extent of Media Coverage of Each Company Per Year 
 
 (1) (2) 
   
Size 62.389*** 62.752*** 
 (8.884) (9.060) 
Par/Price -4.638 -6.851 
 (4.281) (3.876) 
Annual  Return -7.096  
 (13.932)  
Absolute Annual Return  40.006** 
  (12.749) 
Constant 35.742*** 32.526*** 
 (5.940) (4.798) 
   
Observations 798 798 
R-squared 0.506 0.505 
Number of time periods 7 7 
   
Notes: Dependent variable is the total number of columns in which a company is mentioned in a given year. Size is 
market capitalisation in £m, Par/Price is the par value of a share as a fraction of its market price, Annual Return is the 
annual return from the previous year, Absolute Annual Return is simply the absolute value of the annual return. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 9. Media Coverage and Stock Returns: Univariate Comparisons 
  
All periods 
  
Boom 
  
Bust 
  
No Low Extensive 
No –  
Extensive 
t-stat for 
No –  
Extensive 
  
No Low Extensive 
No –  
Extensive 
t-stat for 
No –  
Extensive 
  
No Low Extensive 
No –  
Extensive 
t-stat for 
No –  
Extensive 
                     
Overall 
 -5.6% -3.0% -2.5% -3.1% -2.67 
  
0.1% 4.5% 3.2% -3.1% -1.83 
  
-7.2% -5.7% -4.6% -2.6% -1.87 
  
                   Size 0 -8.5% -3.8% -4.8% -3.8% -1.01 
  
-1.8% 6.1% 10.4% -12.2% -2.68 
  
-10.4% -7.4% -9.6% -0.8% -0.18 
 1 -2.4% -3.5% -4.2% 1.8% 1.12 
  
3.9% 5.3% 2.3% 1.7% 0.57 
  
-4.1% -6.3% -6.9% 2.7% 1.43 
 2 -0.9% -1.1% -1.2% 0.3% 0.23 
  
-1.5% 1.0% 2.3% -3.8% -1.30 
  
-0.7% -1.9% -2.4% 1.8% 1.10 
                     Par/Price 0 -8.5% -4.4% -3.6% -4.9% -2.78 
  
-4.2% 3.3% 0.3% -4.5% -1.56 
  
-9.9% -7.2% -5.0% -4.8% -2.27 
 1 -7.5% -4.1% -2.2% -5.3% -3.45 
  
0.2% 1.7% 2.1% -2.0% -0.91 
  
-9.7% -6.1% -3.8% -5.9% -3.07 
 2 -2.3% -1.3% -1.4% -1.0% -0.37 
  
3.3% 7.9% 8.9% -5.6% -1.60 
  
-3.9% -4.3% -5.0% 1.1% 0.35 
                     Past Return 0 -3.7% -2.5% -1.0% -2.7% -1.36 
  
4.0% 5.3% 3.8% 0.2% 0.05 
  
-5.6% -5.0% -2.5% -3.1% -1.31 
 1 -4.4% -2.0% -1.9% -2.4% -1.38 
  
-2.1% 4.7% 1.9% -4.0% -1.32 
  
-5.2% -4.2% -3.3% -1.9% -0.90 
 2 -8.8% -4.3% -4.6% -4.3% -1.87 
  
-0.9% 3.8% 3.6% -4.5% -1.59 
  
-10.5% -6.8% -7.7% -2.8% -0.98 
                     Current Return 0 1.8% -0.9% -1.7% 3.5% 1.79 
  
3.1% 6.0% 4.8% -1.7% -0.53 
  
1.5% -3.1% -4.0% 5.4% 2.32 
 1 -6.8% -2.5% -1.4% -5.4% -3.18 
  
2.3% 5.7% 3.8% -1.5% -0.56 
  
-9.9% -5.6% -3.1% -6.8% -3.27 
 2 -10.0% -5.4% -4.4% -5.6% -2.55 
  
-3.9% 2.2% 1.3% -5.2% -1.86 
  
-11.7% -8.0% -6.9% -4.9% -1.75 
                     Price 0 -6.1% -1.3% -0.3% -5.8% -1.92 
  
-0.2% 8.4% 8.0% -8.2% -1.77 
  
-7.4% -5.0% -4.0% -3.4% -0.93 
 1 -7.8% -5.9% -5.2% -2.6% -1.14 
  
-1.0% 2.7% 2.8% -3.8% -1.33 
  
-10.3% -8.7% -8.0% -2.3% -0.79 
 2 0.6% -1.6% -1.4% 2.0% 1.80 
  
3.6% 1.0% 1.9% 1.7% 1.27 
  
-0.3% -2.5% -2.5% 2.2% 1.54 
                     Liquidity 0 -11.8% -6.4% -7.9% -3.8% -1.09 
  
0.2% 4.8% 4.6% -4.4% -1.03 
  
-14.6% -10.0% -12.8% -1.8% -0.41 
 1 1.5% -1.7% -1.4% 2.9% 1.84 
  
0.7% 5.0% 4.6% -3.9% -1.84 
  
1.8% -4.1% -3.5% 5.3% 2.71 
 2 -5.6% -0.9% -1.9% -3.7% -2.21 
  
-1.0% 3.6% 2.1% -3.1% -0.95 
  
-7.2% -2.5% -3.3% -4.0% -2.05 
  
                   Notes: Stocks allocated to portfolios based on rankings according to each variable, with 0 referring to lowest values, and 2 referring to highest values. Monthly returns for each stock calculated 
as the change in the log of price, controlling for changes in capital, referred to as par value. Monthly returns calculated for each portfolio based on an equally weighted average of individual 
stock returns. t-stats test whether the difference between No-media and Extensive-media-coverage portfolios is significantly different from zero.
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Table 10. Regressions Explaining Returns on a Portfolio which is  
Long on No Media Coverage Stocks, and Short on Extensive Media Coverage Stocks 
 
 Overall 
(Jan 1843 – Dec 1850) 
Boom 
(Jan 1843 – Sept 1845) 
Bust 
(Oct 1845 – Dec 1850) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Mkt – Rf 0.320 0.193 -0.662 -0.319 0.535* 0.391 
 (0.247) (0.255) (0.602) (0.653) (0.308) (0.331) 
Size SMB  0.433***  0.290  0.475*** 
  (0.123)  (0.179)  (0.166) 
Book/Market HML  -0.238**  -0.240  -0.270* 
  (0.118)  (0.252)  (0.143) 
Liquidity IMM  -0.109  -0.017  -0.085 
  (0.098)  (0.252)  (0.120) 
Constant -0.021 -0.005 -0.024 -0.019 -0.007 0.015 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) 
       
Observations 94 94 31 31 63 63 
R-squared 0.018 0.150 0.040 0.159 0.047 0.184 
       
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is the returns of a portfolio which is long on no media coverage stocks and short on extensive media 
coverage stocks, referred to as No Minus Extensive (NME). Mkt - Rf calculated as the change in logs of a market index of all railway shares minus the risk-free rate. SMB is the returns on a 
portfolio which is long on small stocks and short on big stocks, HML is the returns on a portfolio which is long on high book/market stocks and short on low book/market stocks, and IMM is the 
returns on a portfolio which is long on illiquid stocks and short on the most liquid stocks.  
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Appendix Table 1. Media Coverage and Stock Returns: Number of Observations in Each Portfolio 
  
Overall 
 
Boom 
 
Bust 
  
No Low Extensive 
 
No Low Extensive 
 
No Low Extensive 
Overall 
 849 2262 2120 
 
188 581 562 
 
661 1681 1558 
  
           Size 0 467 884 260 
 
102 234 63 
 
365 650 197 
 1 291 833 620 
 
63 204 181 
 
228 629 439 
 2 91 545 1240 
 
23 143 318 
 
68 402 922 
             Par/Price 0 242 654 809 
 
57 175 211 
 
185 479 598 
 1 246 720 756 
 
54 187 207 
 
192 533 549 
 2 361 888 555 
 
77 219 144 
 
284 669 411 
             Past Return 0 258 690 617 
 
50 167 146 
 
208 523 471 
 1 229 655 755 
 
60 166 193 
 
169 489 562 
 2 323 824 700 
 
55 200 195 
 
268 624 505 
             Current Return 0 246 745 637 
 
49 181 162 
 
197 564 475 
 1 266 688 767 
 
66 188 188 
 
200 500 579 
 2 337 829 716 
 
73 212 212 
 
264 617 504 
             Price 0 472 833 303 
 
90 229 94 
 
382 604 209 
 1 253 813 715 
 
67 202 184 
 
186 611 531 
 2 124 616 1102 
 
31 150 284 
 
93 466 818 
             Liquidity 0 377 757 285 
 
72 185 80 
 
305 572 205 
 1 326 875 628 
 
77 223 167 
 
249 652 461 
 2 146 630 1207 
 
39 173 315 
 
107 457 892 
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Figure 1. Sentiment of Railway Times’ Editorials 
.    
 
Panel A: Weekly Positive Content of 
Railway Times’ Editorials 
using LIWC Software, 1843-50 
Panel B: Weekly Positive Content of 
Railway Times’ Editorials 
using Subjective Assessment, Oct 1843-Oct 1847 
  
  
Notes: LIWC Positivity is the percentage of positive words, as defined by Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), in an article divided by the psychological processes 
word count,.  Positive content is graphed as 13-period moving averages centred around a 
given week.  The railway share index is calculated from weekly share price tables in 
Railway Times.  Capital gains are weighted by the previous period’s market 
capitalization. 
Notes: Forecasting is a subjective assessment of how positive or negative the forecasts made 
in the Railway Times’ editorials were in a given week, with Reporting being a subjective 
assessment of how positive or negative the reporting of events were. Each column for each 
week was scored +1 for positive, 0 for neutral, or -1 for negative, for each measure and the 
average for each week was calculated. Forecasting and Reporting are both graphed as 13-
period moving averages centred around a given week.  The railway share index is calculated 
from weekly share price tables in Railway Times.  Capital gains are weighted by the previous 
period’s market capitalization. 
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Figure 2. Sentiment of Economist’s Railway Supplement 
.    
  
Panel A: Weekly Positive Content of  
Economist’s Railway Supplement  
using LIWC Software, 1845-50 
Panel B: Weekly Positive Content of  
Economist’s Railway Supplement 
using Subjective Assessment, Jan 1845-Oct 1847 
  
  
Notes: LIWC Positivity is the percentage of positive words, as defined by Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), in an article divided by the psychological processes 
word count,.  Positive content is graphed as 13-period moving averages centred around a 
given week.  The railway share index is calculated from weekly share price tables in 
Railway Times.  Capital gains are weighted by the previous period’s market 
capitalization. The Economist’s Railway Supplement began publication in January 1845. 
Notes: Forecasting is a subjective assessment of how positive or negative the forecasts made 
in the Economist’s Railway Supplement were in a given week, with Reporting being a 
subjective assessment of how positive or negative the reporting of events were. Each column 
for each week was scored +1 for positive, 0 for neutral, or -1 for negative, for each measure 
and the average for each week was calculated. Forecasting and Reporting are both graphed 
as 13-period moving averages centred around a given week.  The railway share index is 
calculated from weekly share price tables in Railway Times.  Capital gains are weighted by 
the previous period’s market capitalization. The Economist’s Railway Supplement began 
publication in January 1845. 
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Figure 3. Sentiment of Economist’s Front Page 
.    
 
 
 Panel A: Weekly Positive Content of  
Economist’s Front Page  
using LIWC Software, Sept 1843-Dec 50 
Panel B: Weekly Positive Content of  
Economist’s Front Page 
using Subjective Assessment, Oct 1843-Oct 47 
  
  
Notes: LIWC Positivity is the percentage of positive words, as defined by Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), in an article divided by the psychological processes 
word count,.  Positive content is graphed as 13-period moving averages centred around a 
given week.  The railway share index is calculated from weekly share price tables in 
Railway Times.  Capital gains are weighted by the previous period’s market 
capitalization. The Economist’s front page began publication in September 1843. 
Notes: Forecasting is a subjective assessment of how positive or negative the forecasts made 
in the Economist’s front page were in a given week, with Reporting being a subjective 
assessment of how positive or negative the reporting of events were. Each column for each 
week was scored +1 for positive, 0 for neutral, or -1 for negative, for each measure and the 
average for each week was calculated. Forecasting and Reporting are both graphed as 13-
period moving averages centred around a given week.  The railway share index is calculated 
from weekly share price tables in Railway Times.  Capital gains are weighted by the previous 
period’s market capitalization. 
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Figure 4. Index of Railway Excess Returns in the Weeks  
Before and After Publication of Editorials in The Times and The Economist 
 
 
Notes: Excess returns calculated as railway returns minus non-railway returns, based 
on market indices of both which have been calculated by weighting individual stocks 
by their market capitalisation. Index begins at a level of 1,000 at the start of the week 
in which an editorial is published. 
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Figure 5. Market Indices of Railway Shares by Extent of Media Coverage 
 
 
 
Notes: Stocks allocated to portfolios based on the extent of media coverage during the 
previous month. Monthly returns for each stock calculated as the change in the log of 
price, controlling for changes in capital. Monthly returns calculated for each portfolio 
based on an equally-weighted average of individual stock returns. Market indices 
calculated from these returns, using a base of 1,000 for January 1843. 
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Figure 6. Market Index of Established Railway Shares and 
Dividend / Par Ratio for those Railways 
 
 
Notes: Sample includes those established railways which were operating from the 
beginning of the Mania, before January 1843, and therefore potentially capable of 
paying dividends. The railway share index is calculated from weekly share price 
tables in Railway Times.  Capital gains are weighted by the previous period’s 
market capitalization.  The dividend / par ratio is the amount of dividends paid by 
all railways divided by the total par (paid-up capital) of the railway industry. 
Dividends were obtained from the Course of the Exchange.  
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Figure 7. Adverts for New Railway Promotions in the Railway Times 
and Number of Railway Securities Listed on London Stock Exchange, 1843-50 
 
 
 
Notes: Word count of adverts was obtained by scanning in all company 
adverts in the Railway Times and running the scans through the Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software.  The number of securities listed 
was calculated from weekly share price tables in Railway Times. 
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